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Abstract 
Validation accuracy is a necessary, but not sufficient, meas-
ure of a neural network classifier’s quality. High validation 
accuracy during development does not guarantee that a 
model is free of serious flaws, such as vulnerability to ad-
versarial attacks or a tendency to misclassify (with high 
confidence) data it was not trained on. The model may also 
be incomprehensible to a human or base its decisions on un-
reasonable criteria. These problems, which are not unique to 
classifiers, have been the focus of a substantial amount of 
recent research. However, they are not prioritized during 
model development, which almost always optimizes on val-
idation accuracy to the exclusion of everything else. The 
product of this approach is likely to fail in unexpected ways 
outside of the training environment. We believe that, in ad-
dition to validation accuracy, the model development pro-
cess must give added weight to other performance metrics 
such as explainability, resistance to adversarial attacks, and 
overconfidence on out-of-distribution data. 
 1. Introduction  
Neural networks have proliferated in the past decade to the 
point that they are now a significant part of the digital eco-
system. They have been used to: build popular entertain-
ment apps and web services (Anglade 2017, Paez 2019, 
Stark 2017), search engines (Clark 2015), and facial recog-
nition software (Buolamwini 2018); allow actors to assume 
the appearance of politicians and celebrities (Zakharov 
2019); operate autonomous vehicles (Bojarski et al. 2016); 
analyze satellite imagery and other long-range/remote 
sensing data (Zhu et al. 2017); and much more. 
 Paralleling the increasing presence of neural network-
based products in everyday life is a growing public aware-
ness of their potential shortcomings. Flawed machine 
learning models, many of them based on neural networks, 
comprise a significant fraction of all implementations and 
have been making headlines for years. Specific examples 
include racial (Angwin et al. 2016; Barr 2015; Buranyi 
2017; Garvie et al. 2016; Hunt 2016) and gender (Day 
2019) bias, broken trending algorithms (Thielman 2016), 
innocent people identified as criminals (Dodd 2018), and 
death (Marshall and Davies 2019). These are separate from 
incidents involving the successful application of machine 
learning for nefarious purposes, such as the Face-
book/Cambridge Analytica scandal (Cadwalladr 2019). 
 The “standard” neural network development process 
optimizes for performance on a specific distribution of 
data, but does not optimize for generality, explainability, or 
robustness. These qualities have been the subject of a sub-
stantial amount of research, but despite the advances in this 
area the vast majority of work treats them as secondary 
considerations, if at all. We believe that many model fail-
ures are preventable and attribute them to (i) the machine 
learning community’s tendency to compartmentalize ro-
bustness research, (ii) companies’ failure to address ro-
bustness during development and marketing, and (iii) end 
users’ low awareness of the potential risks. 
 Below, we describe what this means for the case of a 
neural network classifier trained on labeled data, the same 
case we examined quantitatively in (Hyatt and Lee 2019). 
None of the technical ideas are new: partial solutions to 
this problem already exist, and only need to be incorpo-
rated into the development process. We emphasize that the 
basic concepts also apply to other types of neural networks, 
such as unsupervised classifiers and regression models.  
 In this paper we take the position that in order to make 
models trustworthy, transparent, robust, and resilient, these 
qualities must be prioritized from the beginning of the de-
velopment process. We specifically hope to make this case 
to non-technical policymakers and others considering the 
purchase, use, and regulation of neural networks, especial-
ly in the public sector and government. We also hope re-
searchers will view this not only as an ethical concern but 
as an opportunity to strengthen the foundations of the field. 
2. Example: Supervised Classifiers 
Broadly speaking, most supervised classifiers are devel-
oped using some variation of the same basic procedure 
(Russell and Norvig 2009): 
1. Collect a dataset containing many examples of 
each class to be identified, as well as their labels. 
2. Split the data into training, validation, and test 
sets. 
3. Choose a model architecture and training scheme 
(loss function, optimizer, etc.). 
4. Iteratively update the model by feeding it the 
training data and adjusting its weights to maxim-
ize the fraction of the training set the model clas-
sifies correctly. 
5. After each iteration, evaluate the classifier’s accu-
racy on the validation set. 
6. Repeat step 5 until the validation accuracy plat-
eaus. 
7. If the validation accuracy is unsatisfactory, repeat 
steps 3–6 with a different architecture and/or 
training scheme. 
8. Evaluate the best model on the test set and report 
those results. Training is complete. 
Throughout the training process, every major decision is 
driven by the value of one metric, in this case the valida-
tion accuracy. However, this sort of narrow evaluation, 
which ignores numerous sources of uncertainty in both the 
development process and the model’s expected real-world 
performance, greatly oversimplifies the problem. 
 To begin with, the training data may be subject to biases 
or constraints that the real-world data is not. To take a 
high-profile example involving the public sector, consider 
commercial face-recognition software, which has been 
used with minimal restraint by police departments across 
the country despite substantial racial bias encoded into 
these products (Garvie et al. 2016). Face recognition mod-
els are frequently trained on an insufficiently diverse da-
taset with unbalanced race/gender demographics. Because 
the validation set comes from the same distribution of data 
as the training set, it masks this problem and prevents it 
from being addressed during the development process, 
leading to finished products that incorporate the racial and 
gender bias present in the data (Buolamwini and Gebru 
2018; Phillips et al. 2011). Face recognition software de-
veloped in the West identifies white men with a high de-
gree of accuracy, performing significantly worse with 
women and people of color, and worst of all with women 
of color. Similarly, Chinese software is very good at identi-
fying Asian men, but not women or non-Asians. Depend-
ing on the specific metric, performance on dark-skinned 
women can be up to 10× worse than for light-skinned men 
(Buolamwini and Gebru 2018). 
 Truly out-of-distribution data presents a distinct but 
closely-related hazard (Hendrycks and Gimpel 2017; Lak-
shminarayanan et al. 2017; Lee et al. 2018; Li and Gal 
2017). Continuing the previous example, how does face 
recognition software classify an image of something that is 
not a human face? Rather than failing to correctly identify 
classes underrepresented in the training data, such a classi-
fier might make nonsensical predictions on data it was not 
trained to handle. By design, a classifier’s predictions are 
restricted to the classes it was intended to identify (in this 
case, faces). However, it should not identify something that 
is not a human face with high confidence. 
 To identify problems like these in development, or pin-
point their causes when they occur in the wild, a human 
must be able to understand why the classifier makes the 
predictions it does. Similarly, a human using it must be 
able to trust that the classifier is making decisions in a ra-
tional way. In other words, a model should be explainable, 
at least to a specialist (and ideally to anyone using it). 
 Finally, even if the model is neither biased nor overcon-
fident when presented with out-of-distribution data, it may 
be vulnerable to an adversarial attack (Yuan et al. 2017). 
The attacker identifies the shortest distance, in the model’s 
internal representation of the input space, to the boundary 
separating the predicted class from another class, and per-
turbs the input data along that path. Seemingly negligible 
changes to the data, chosen in this way, can cause the 
model to misclassify an input. Adversarial attacks are noto-
riously difficult to prevent, even if the attacker does not 
have access to the details of the original model or the data 
used to train it (Papernot et al. 2017). Training the model 
on adversarially generated data does not provide a com-
plete solution to the problem (Kurakin et al 2017), alt-
hough it likely helps bring the training data closer to the 
real-world target distribution. This phenomenon can also 
overlap with out-of-distribution data, as it is possible to 
generate unrecognizable data that the model nevertheless 
identifies with high confidence (Nguyen et al. 2015). 
 There is a common theme tying these challenges togeth-
er: high validation accuracy does not imply that the model 
will overcome them. Biased datasets are a recognized prob-
lem (although much work remains to be done in that area) 
but the roles of model design and optimization metrics are 
less explored. The standard model development process 
optimizes only validation accuracy, when it should addi-
tionally optimize for a family of robustness criteria: for 
example, confidence of predictions on out-of-distribution 
data, explainability, and resistance to adversarial attacks. 
Our research (Hyatt and Lee 2019) indicates that these 
criteria are related to one another and provide complemen-
tary windows into the quality of the model’s internal repre-
sentation of the data. For example, explainable models tend 
to be those that segment their input space with reasonable 
decision boundaries, and therefore are less susceptible to 
adversarial attacks. This overlap may also help offset the 
increased cost to optimize and test for robustness – it may 
be enough to optimize for the cheapest metric early on, 
then either use the others to refine the model or as inde-
pendent tests of its robustness. For these reasons, because 
of variation within a given test (e.g., resistance to different 
types of adversarial attack), and because of the harms al-
ready occasioned by overemphasizing validation accuracy, 
we hesitate to promote a specific robustness metric. This is 
a complex problem, and without a complete theory of ma-
chine learning any metrics will be somewhat ad hoc. 
 We note that having a human in the loop is not a solu-
tion. In some cases this is because humans are not able to 
easily understand the type or volume of data; humans 
(even experts) also have a tendency to trust supposedly 
authoritative predictions; and having a human constantly 
monitor the network’s output cancels out any benefits 
gained by automating the decision-making process. 
3. Solutions 
The ideas in the preceding section apply equally to neural 
networks other than supervised classifiers, and our sug-
gested solution is the same in all cases. Independent of the 
values of the network weights, the network architecture 
determines both the amount of information that can be en-
coded in the model as well as the path that information 
takes through the network during training. Architecture is 
not the same as size: smaller networks with the correct 
architecture optimize much more effectively and are more 
robust than large, poorly-designed networks. However, a 
robust model must encode more (sometimes much more) 
information than one which merely performs well on the 
validation set. There are well-known trade-offs between 
accuracy and robustness for a given architecture, and also 
between accuracy or robustness and the architecture itself, 
in terms of cost (to train, to store, and to evaluate). Opti-
mizing network design for robustness in addition to metrics 
such as validation accuracy will mean designing architec-
tures that can efficiently encode sufficient information. 
 Because the network requires more information to make 
reasonable decisions in unusual circumstances (and there-
fore meet robustness criteria such as those outlined above), 
this will inevitably increase network size and training cost 
relative to a naïve network. This cost is in addition to any 
required to ensure that the training data distribution match-
es the real world. Designing a network that performs well 
on these metrics will cost much more than the current (in-
sufficient) industry standard, resulting in “sticker shock” – 
especially since some robustness metrics are not easily 
captured by a single number. However, we believe that the 
benefits more than make up for the increased cost. 
 Finally, designing a network from scratch to solve an 
arbitrary problem is not possible at this point. Most model 
development is based off of heuristics, trial and error, and 
adapting existing solutions to similar problems. There is 
not a complete theoretical foundation for neural network 
model design. 
 The closest extant solution is the young field of auto-
mated machine learning (auto-ML), in which a meta-model 
is trained, itself in a non-explainable fashion, to build net-
works to solve particular problems. However, to our 
knowledge, these meta-models always define success sole-
ly in terms of the generated model’s validation accuracy 
(Fusi et al. 2018; Jin et al. 2018; Zoph and Le 2017), 
meaning that the generated models will have all the short-
comings described above. In principle, there is no reason 
that the auto-ML optimization criteria cannot include other 
metrics. 
 We see three solutions to the problems described above, 
at least one of which should be applied to any neural net-
work model, but especially those used in critical, public 
sector, and/or governmental applications: 
 Incorporate robustness optimization, including ex-
isting measures, explicitly into the development 
process and verify that the finished model meets 
predetermined robustness standards. If it does not, 
the model architecture must be changed and the 
model re-trained, possibly with additional data. 
(In the training outline at the beginning of Section 
2, this modifies step 7.) 
 Expand current auto-ML meta-models to optimize 
for a number of robustness metrics in addition to 
validation accuracy. 
 Develop our theoretical understanding of machine 
learning so that the requirements to solve an arbi-
trary problem (network architecture, training 
scheme, data attributes, etc.) can be determined 
from first principles at the beginning of the devel-
opment process. 
Of these, only the first can be implemented using currently 
available tools, though this will substantially increase de-
velopment costs. As with the current process, heuristics 
learned over time will bring this cost down, but the process 
will always be more time-consuming than it is now. 
 The second could be achieved using nearly current tech-
nology with enough investment. Companies like Microsoft 
and Google (which already market auto-ML services) 
would need to be incentivized or required by law to do so.  
 The third is a long-term goal and will likely require 
years of research, and for the machine learning community 
to work closely with experts in fields like mathematics, 
physics, and information theory.  
 Regardless of the details, there is a pressing need for 
comprehensive, industry-wide standards in this field. 
4. Conclusion 
Current top-line numbers reported for neural networks 
(e.g., validation accuracy) overestimate those networks’ 
strengths and downplay their weaknesses. Only a small 
fraction of neural network research papers verify the ro-
bustness of their models unless that is the explicit purpose 
of the paper; most machine learning competitions do not 
require this type of evaluation; and commercial machine 
learning products are not held to a comprehensive stand-
ard. Similarly, most end users of neural network products 
are unaware of the severity of these issues. It is critical to 
hold these products to high standards of accountability and 
transparency, particularly in the public sphere, and the only 
way to do that is to ensure that robustness is a primary con-
sideration during model development. 
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